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SURROGACY, CHILD’S WELFARE, AND PUBLIC POLICY
IN ADOPTION APPLICATIONS
UKM v Attorney-General
Tan Seow Hon∗
This case note discusses the Singapore High Court case of UKM, in which an order was granted to
a gay man to adopt his biological son conceived through a gestational surrogacy arrangement in the
United States. In particular, the High Court’s assessment of the welfare of the child and of public
policy, in light of two factors—the prohibition of male homosexual acts in section 377A of the Penal
Code and the de facto curtailment of domestic surrogacy by Singapore’s restrictive rules relating to
the use of assisted reproduction technology services—will be examined.
I. Introduction
This case note examines the role of policy considerations in adjudication in UKM
v Attorney-General,1 a case in which a bench of three judges (Sundaresh Menon
CJ, Judith Prakash JA and Debbie Ong J) in the Family Division of the Singapore
High Court reversed a Family Courts decision2 and granted an adoption order to
a gay man to adopt his biological son conceived through a gestational surrogacy
arrangement in the United States (“US”). As the High Court extensively eluci-
dated the role of public policy in judicial decisions, this case note will analyze
the interaction between statutory law and policy, in view of the separation of powers
doctrine insofar as it relates to the legislature and the judiciary. In particular, the
High Court’s assessment of the child’s welfare and of public policy in light of two
factors—the criminalization of male homosexual acts in section 377A of the Penal
Code3 and the de facto curtailment of domestic surrogacy by Singapore’s restric-
tive rules relating to the use of assisted reproduction technology4 services—will be
examined.
∗ Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. The author is grateful for the
helpful suggestions of an anonymous referee of the journal.
1 [2018] SGHCF 18 [UKM].
2 Re UKM [2018] SGFC 20 [Re UKM].
3 Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed Sing, s 377A [section 377A].
4 (“ART”).
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II. Matrix of Surrogacy
Surrogacy may be chosen because pregnancy is impossible or risky for a woman;
because gay men wish to have children with genetic connection to one of them; or
because lesbians wish to experience co-maternity by having one partner carry the
fertilized ovum of the other.5 Conceivably, some may choose surrogacy to avoid
the inconvenience of pregnancy, though the intended mother would have to endure
the extraction of ova if she wishes to maintain a genetic connection. Others may be
desirous of heirs or children without a relationship with the child’s mother.6 Less
commonly, others may choose surrogacy over adoption even if the intended child
has no genetic connection, if they wish to select what they view as the combination
of ideal genetic material from sperm and ova donors with certain qualities, or if they
wish to avoid adoption-related complications.
Altruistic surrogacy involves no monetary profit while commercial surrogacy
involves the surrogate getting a fee and typically involves third party brokers. Tra-
ditional surrogacy involves artificial insemination with the intended father’s or a
donor’s sperm, with the surrogate contributing the ovum and being the biological
mother of the baby, while gestational surrogacy involves the surrogate carrying a
baby that is conceived with the ovum of the intended mother or donor, and the sperm
of the intended father or donor.
Unless surrogacy is done through home insemination of sperm into a traditional
surrogate, sexual intercourse with a surrogate, or overseas ART services pursuant
to surrogacy arrangements between persons who subsequently return to Singapore
to carry the pregnancy to term,7 surrogacy cannot be done within Singapore due to
restrictions on the use of ART.8 Overseas surrogacy remains a live concern for the
Singapore government if Singaporeans apply for adoption orders to legitimize their
relationship with biological children conceived through surrogacy, or if they apply for
citizenship for such children. The government needs to take a stand on surrogacy even
if it never intends to legalize domestic surrogacy. Granting adoption or citizenship to
children conceived through surrogacy indirectly encourages the surrogacy industry
as Singaporeans desirous of children may engage such services knowing that they
could get approval after the fact. If the industry is exploitative or unethical, the
government may be seen as indirectly encouraging morally suspect acts.
III. Facts and Holding of UKM
The appellant, a gay doctor who had agreed with his long-term partner to raise
a child together, applied as a single male to adopt his biological child conceived
5 Douglas Nejaime, “The Nature of Parenthood” (2016) 126 Yale LJ 2260 at 2306.
6 For eg, Lee Shau-kee, one of the richest men in Asia, became the grandfather of triplets when his
bachelor son engaged a surrogate in California. See SCMP Reporter, “Peter Lee surrogacy case
referred to police” (2 December 2010) South China Morning Post, online: South China Morning Post
<https://www.scmp.com/article/732171/peter-lee-surrogacy-case-referred-police>.
7 In this case, the gestational mother is treated as the mother even though she goes through ART overseas:
Status of Children (Assisted Reproduction Technology) Act, Cap 317A, 2015 Rev Ed Sing, s 6 [SCARTA].
8 Licensing Terms and Conditions on Assisted Reproduction Services (26 April 2011), pursuant to the
Private Hospitals and Medical Clinics Act, Cap 248, 1999 Rev Ed Sing, s 6(5).
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through overseas surrogacy in UKM. The appellant’s and his partner’s sperm were
provided to fertilize a donor’s egg(s). His sperm resulted in the successful creation
of an embryo but his partner’s did not.9 A gestational surrogate in the US was
paid to carry the pregnancy to term.10 The child’s birth certificate from the State
of Pennsylvania listed the surrogate and the appellant as the parents. The surrogate
swore an affidavit to relinquish her parental rights to the appellant, as agreed. The
child, a US citizen, was brought to Singapore, where the appellant applied for, and
was denied, citizenship for him. The child was granted a Long-Term Visit Pass. The
appellant applied for adoption to increase the chance for citizenship for the child
and to legitimize their relationship. The Ministry of Social and Family Development
rejected the application.
A. Lower Court Decision
In the Family Courts, the Guardian-in-Adoption argued against adoption on the
ground of public policy as the application was in effect seeking the court’s endorse-
ment of his intent to form a same-sex family unit.11 The Guardian-in-Adoption
argued that the Adoption of Children Act12 reflected Singapore’s public policy that
encouraged parenthood within a heterosexual family unit.
The District Judge noted that the appellant knewART was not available to him and
sought to achieve his desired result by applying for adoption,13 in essence getting the
court “to sanction a fait accompli”.14 The adoption order was sought not so much for
the child’s welfare, given that the child was “well-maintained” and “not stateless”,
but for the appellant’s interest,15 to increase his chance of getting citizenship for
the child. There was no need to give an adoption order to remove any stigma of
illegitimacy as the appellant was recognized as the biological father in the US birth
certificate. The District Judge found it troubling that the child was denied the right to
know his mother, especially in view of the “deep, almost abstruse desire of adopted
children” to know their biological parents.16
B. High Court Decision
The High Court reversed the decision,17 stating that an adoption order would enhance
the child’s prospects of remaining in Singapore by entitling him to apply for citizen-
ship on a different ground. With citizenship granted, care arrangements would be
9 Re UKM, supra note 2 at para 6.
10 Ibid at para 7. The surrogate’s husband was also paid for lost wages as he accompanied his wife for
medical procedures.
11 Ibid at para 14.
12 Cap 4, 2012 Rev Ed Sing [ACA].
13 Re UKM, supra note 2 at para 33.
14 Ibid at para 43.
15 Ibid at para 42.
16 Ibid at para 36.
17 The court considered a further issue of whether the appellant made a prohibited payment in relation to
adoption under ACA, supra note 12, s 11, but as the article is focusing on a jurisprudential analysis of
the role of public policy considerations in adjudication, that issue would not be examined.
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stabilized, giving caregivers peace of mind, and in turn contributing to the child’s
“sense of security and overall emotional well-being”.18 The countervailing public
policy consideration against allowing adoption was not sufficiently weighty against
the “statutory imperative” to promote the child’s welfare.19 The High Court embarked
on a two-stage inquiry. First, it determined what the child’s welfare required; sec-
ond, it examined whether there were countervailing public policy considerations that
defeated the claim based on the child’s welfare, if established. This will be detailed
in the analysis that follows. This case note will critically examine two main themes
of the High Court’s reasoning in the two-stage inquiry—the relevance of the forma-
tion of a same-sex family unit and of the deliberate conception of the child through
surrogacy.
IV. Welfare of Child, Public Policy, and Section 377A
Section 5(b) of the ACA required that an adoption order be made for the child’s
welfare. The High Court held that section 3 of the Guardianship of Infants Act,20
which required the court to regard the welfare of the infant as the “first and
paramount consideration”, applied to adoption applications.21 An adoption order
in the child’s welfare should be made unless there were compelling reasons, such as
a countervailing public policy, not to.22
A. Stage 1 of Court’s Enquiry: Child’s Welfare
The child’s welfare referred to his well-being “in the most exhaustive sense of the
word”—embracing his “physical, intellectual, psychological, emotional, moral and
religious well-being”, in both the short and long term.23 It referred “not only to
his psychological and emotional development, but also to the environment within
which his sense of identity, purpose and morality will be cultivated”.24 The High
Court noted that it had to assess if the proposed parenting arrangement would cause
injury or detriment to the morals of the child, with due regard to the nature of the
parents’ relationship. For example, if it were proposed for a child to be brought up
in “a polyamorous five-parent household in which each parent (was) in a sexual
relationship with the other four”, the court would “be fully entitled, in the light
of the prevailing morality of our society” to reject the application as “the child’s
being raised in such a family would be injurious to his sense of identity, purpose and
morality”.25
18 UKM, supra note 1 at paras 65, 67.
19 Ibid at para 248.
20 Cap 122, 1985 Rev Ed Sing.
21 UKM, supra note 1 at para 50.
22 Ibid at para 57.
23 Ibid at para 45.
24 Ibid at para 47.
25 Ibid at para 47. Supposed social stigmatization from being brought up in an unconventional family unit
per se was irrelevant as the child would remain with the same family even if an order were not granted
(at paras 81, 82). The High Court noted that the Guardian did not argue that the child’s welfare would
be affected in that his sense of identity and morality would be adversely affected by being brought up
by a gay person (at para 83).
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B. Stage 2 of Court’s Enquiry: Countervailing Public Policy
If an order was in a child’s welfare, section 3(1) of the ACA, gave the court a general
discretion which, given the scheme and legislative history, allowed the court to
consider, amongst other things, “any public policy. . . relevant to any aspect of the
institution of adoption”, which was in turn “premised on other foundational social
institutions, such as parenthood and family”,26 and the consideration of which was
distinct from the assessment of the child’s welfare.27
Public policy, at this second stage of the inquiry, “involved arguments about the
public or common good” and were of two types:
1. Legal policy involved “arguments for the common good that relate[d] to the
conduct and consequences of legal practice”.
2. Socio-economic policy referred to “arguments for the common good that
relate more broadly to what would be good for society in general, especially
from a social, economic, cultural and political perspective”,28 matters on
which the court may lack expertise or information.29
Employing public policy in adjudication tended to be “unruly”30 because it would
take the court beyond the parties to the community’s interests,31 and because there
was no easy consensus on its content, which might also change with the times.32 For
adjudication in relation to statutes, in particular,33 the court had to be “very cautious”
as a regime “which [embedded] the public policies” assessed to be relevant by a
democratically elected legislature had been created.34 The court cautioned that:
They must therefore be very slow to decide a case based on any adaptation of
the legislative regime founded on what they themselves happen to think about
the asserted public policy, whether legal or socio-economic, even if the relevant
legislation is revealed to be lacking in some respect.35
Particularly for socio-economic policy for statutes, any relevant policy should be that
of parliament and the parliamentary executive,36 or one which was found to “reflect
some fundamental purpose of the law”.37
Essentially, policy would be employed as an argument for curtailing a statu-
tory right. The rationale for the court’s involvement of policy even while it was
26 Ibid at para 97.
27 Ibid at para 98.
28 Ibid at para 111.
29 Ibid at paras 113, 126.
30 Ibid at para 107.
31 Ibid at para 108.
32 Ibid at para 109.
33 When dealing with judge-made law, the court was delegated the role of law-maker: ibid at para 113.
34 Ibid at paras 115, 125.
35 Ibid at para 115.
36 Ibid at para 115. An example of a source was ministerial statements made in their official capacity: para
141.
37 Ibid at paras 130, 133. There could be a value or purpose underlying the legislative provisions that may
be regarded as a public policy, and this could be confirmed by other statutes: para 139.
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interpreting the law was that insofar as its duty was “to visit the consequences of the
law on members of society”,38 it had to consider the effect of the law, when applied,
on the common good. When the application violated “an established public policy
or a fundamental purpose of the law itself”,39 the court had to balance the need to
give effect to the regime (which itself had a value underlying the claimed right40)
against the need to protect the common good.41
To balance countervailing policies against the welfare, “objective criteria” were
assessed:
1. How connected was the policy to the legal issue?
2. Did the policy emanate from the applicable statutory regime?
3. To what degree would the countervailing public policy be violated if the
claimed right were given effect to?42 For example, polyamory of five parents
departed significantly from the normative standard of the policy, the tradi-
tional family unit.43 Further, whether the party seeking to enforce the right
deliberately set out to violate the policy was pertinent.44
The High Court found a public policy in favor of parenthood within marriage but not
policies against other forms of parenthood45 or planned and deliberate parenthood
by singles through ART or surrogacy.46 The only countervailing policy, discerned
particularly through the 2007 parliamentary debates over section 377A, as well as
section 12(1) of the Women’s Charter47 which treated as void non-heterosexual
marriages, was that against the formation of same-sex family units, whether with
one or two homosexual parents.48 In terms of the objective criteria, the High Court
held:
1. An adoption order positively affirmed the attempt to form a same-sex fam-
ily unit, having “an appreciable effect on traditional parenting norms in
Singapore, which the Prime Minister was eager to preserve”.49
2. The policy did not arise from the relevant statute.
3. The policy would be violated significantly by an adoption order but it was
unclear whether the appellant set out to violate any public policy, though the
High Court noted it would be harder to make the same argument in a future
case given its judgment.50
38 Ibid at para 121.
39 Ibid at para 121.
40 Ibid at para 149.
41 Ibid at paras 118, 148.
42 Ibid at paras 154-157.
43 Ibid at para 158.
44 Ibid at para 159.
45 Ibid at para 192.
46 Ibid at paras 193-201.
47 Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed Sing [Women’s Charter].
48 UKM, supra note 1 at paras 202, 204, 206.
49 Ibid at para 207.
50 Ibid at para 246.
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On balance, the High Court held that the child’s welfare prevailed over the sole
countervailing public policy identified by the High Court.
C. Analysis of the Court’s Two-Stage Enquiry
The High Court’s appreciation of the judiciary’s limited role as interpreter of the law
was in line with its stance in recent cases such as Yong Vui Kong v PP,51 where the
Court of Appeal refrained from being a “super-legislature” by reading unenumerated
rights into the Constitution,52 and Lim Meng Suang v AG,53 where it refrained from
being a “mini-legislature” in pronouncing an object of the law to be illegitimate.54
In Lim Meng Suang, the Court of Appeal sought to decide based on “objective legal
rules and principles”.55 Referring to Ronald Dworkin’s theory of adjudication, it
distinguished between “extra-legal considerations…uniquely within the purview of
the Legislature” and “extra-legal considerations in so far as they impact the appli-
cation of constitutional provisions” and when “absolutely necessary” to enable the
court to apply the relevant legal principles relating to those provisions.56 This cau-
tious trajectory, based on respect for the elected legislature’s mandate as well as
the acknowledgement of the court’s lack of expertise, was seemingly continued in
UKM, albeit by reference to “public policy” in the context of legislative provisions
instead of “extra-legal considerations” in the context of constitutional provisions,
with the willingness to consider socio-economic policy insofar as implicated by the
legislature and parliamentary executive.
With due respect, based on the cautious trajectory, however, the fact that a
same-sex family unit was being formed should not only have been considered as
a countervailing socio-economic consideration impacting the common good that
defeated a claimed right based on the child’s welfare if it was weighty enough.
Instead, it should also have had a bearing on the assessment of the child’s welfare.
The issues with parenting within a same-sex family unit, albeit extra-legal, could
have been regarded as absolutely necessary to determine whether adoption was in
the welfare of the child. The High Court volunteered the example of polyamorous
parenting as injurious to the child’s sense of identity, purpose, and morality in light
of prevailing societal morality—matters pertinent to assessing the child’s welfare.
It then held that the adoption order granted to a single male homosexual person of
his own biological son was in the child’s welfare, despite the intent for co-parenting
with his sexual partner. The necessary implication was that homosexual parenting
was not problematic in the same way that polyamorous parenting was.
This conclusion that the court would have been entitled to conclude that
polyamorous parenting was injurious to the child, while not finding the same with
regard to parenting in a same-sex unit, is problematic on two grounds. First, it is
inconsistent with the basis of section 377A. Section 377Awas retained after extensive
51 [2015] 2 SLR 1129 (CA).
52 Ibid at para 75.
53 [2014] 1 SLR 26 (CA) [Lim Meng Suang].
54 Ibid at para 77.
55 Ibid at para 7.
56 Ibid at para 6. It should be noted that Ronald Dworkin used different terminology but this will not be
discussed here.
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parliamentary debate, which, given what was discussed, should have been conclusive
of the legislature’s determination about prevailing societal morality or injury to the
common good. The High Court accepted the legislative determination of prevailing
morality, in view of its deference to legislative mandate and its acknowledgment of
the lack of expertise on certain matters. It is commonsensical that because of the
nature of the parent-child relationship, parents have a principal role in the trans-
mission of moral norms to children and that such norms that would be transmitted
inevitably included those relating to the nature of their relationship. Insofar as the
High Court accepted that prevailing societal morality had been determined by the
legislature to be opposed to same-sex relationships,57 it should have concluded that
the proposed parenting arrangement would cause injury or detriment to the morals
of the child (thereby affecting the welfare of the child), from the point of view of
prevailing societal morality. This is despite the fact, as the High Court noted, that
the Guardian did not contend that being brought up by a gay person would adversely
affect the child’s sense of identity or morality and therefore undermine his welfare,58
given that the conclusion about the detrimental effect did not hinge on any special
finding of fact relating to the particular set of parents (in which case, the court would
have been limited to evidence presented before it). Second, if the court impliedly
decided that parenting in a same-sex unit was not injurious but parenting within
polyamory was, how would other alternative family units be assessed?
A conservative interpretation and application of the ACA arguably required the
High Court to decide that adoption was not for the child’s welfare in view of
the moral basis of section 377A, rendering the next stage of the inquiry—policy
considerations—unnecessary. Considering the formation of same-sex family units
under the second stage lent to the High Court’s reluctance to give effect to it, as now
a claimed right had been established based on the child’s welfare.
Moreover, the second stage of the inquiry—policy considerations—was prob-
lematic in two ways. First, the assignment of weight to the criteria afforded much
subjective leeway to the court even if the High Court said that “objective criteria”
delineated the inquiry. The High Court found in favor of the child’s welfare despite
the satisfaction of the first and, to some extent, the third criteria. Second, the High
Court viewed adoption as premised on other foundational social institutions such as
parenthood and family, and noted that public policies could have been embedded
within legislation by the elected legislature. If so, the second criterion pertaining to
the source of the countervailing policy should not have been construed so narrowly.
The institution of adoption was inextricably linked to other foundational social insti-
tutions protected by laws. The High Court itself acknowledged the legislative stance
underlying section 377A and also section 12(1) of the Women’s Charter.59 Counte-
nancing the underlying policies of such laws pertaining to related foundational social
institutions, given that those policies carry legislative mandate,60 was essential to
interpreting the ACA and giving coherence to all related laws.
57 UKM, supra note 1 at paras 204-206.
58 Lim Meng Suang, supra note 53 at para 83.
59 UKM, supra note 1 at para 206.
60 Ibid at para 162.
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V. Surrogacy and Public Policy
The High Court found that deliberate conception through surrogacy did not
“conceptually” affect the analysis of the welfare of the child.61
Moreover, there was no clear public policy against surrogacy for the second stage
of the inquiry.62 While gestational surrogacy could not be procured via ART here,
neither domestic nor international surrogacy was criminalized. 63 Adoption orders
had been granted to married intended parents.64 The High Court opined that despite
multifarious ethical considerations relating to surrogacy, it should not articulate a
policy against surrogacy when none was found.65 Indeed, it noted that, rather than
relying on a policy against surrogacy, the Guardian-in-Adoption relied on a policy
against singles intentionally using ART or surrogacy for parenthood.66 It acknowl-
edged that granting adoption orders resulted in dissonance with the SCARTA67 insofar
as intended parents could achieve through adoption orders what SCARTA did not
allow—for them to displace a gestational mother and her husband.68
While the High Court did not express whether its decision would have been
different if there was a clear governmental stance against surrogacy, it noted the lack
of a clear position on surrogacy was unsatisfactory as it would have been a relevant
countervailing policy given that surrogacy was a critical step to adoption.69
Given that adoption orders had been granted in overseas surrogacy cases to married
couples, the High Court was left to deny an adoption order if an overseas surrogacy
case involving homosexuals was not a “like” case, either because it was not in the
welfare of the child, or because there was a sufficiently weighty countervailing public
policy, as was discussed in the previous part. The government must clarify its stand
on surrogacy and adoption.
It is proposed that the government treats domestic and overseas surrogacy con-
sistently. What the government decides for domestic surrogacy should impact how
it deals with overseas surrogacy, at least insofar as similar ethical issues plague the
transactions. The government is confronted with overseas surrogacy generally in
applications for adoption or citizenship. Should adoption orders be granted? One
would first ask whether the ACA is meant to deal with situations of the adoption of
one’s biological child. Denying an adoption order amounts to refusing to legitimize
the parent-child relationship, but the intended parent who provided the gamete might
already be listed as a parent on the birth certificate and in any case is the biological
parent. Denying legitimacy of the parent-child relationship in a case where the appli-
cant is the biological parent is not unusual and does not change the parentage: after
all, children born out of wedlock—a different category of cases—are not legitimate
61 Ibid at para 67.
62 Ibid at para 163.
63 Ibid at paras 173, 174.
64 Ibid at para 176.
65 Ibid at para 185.
66 Ibid at paras 167, 185.
67 SCARTA, supra note 7. This did not apply to the child as he was born before it came into force: ibid at
para 72.
68 Ibid at para 186.
69 Ibid at para 249.
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despite being biological children.70 One mode of legitimation of children born out
of wedlock is through the Legitimacy Act. If an adoption order was granted in a
case such as UKM, in what other cases might an adoption application be made for
the purpose of obtaining citizenship, and could they be consistently denied in those
cases? An example relates to children born overseas out of wedlock to foreign moth-
ers and Singaporean fathers, as such children do not have citizenship by descent.71
Generally, adoption orders cannot be made on application by one spouse without the
consent of the other.72 If the wife consents, the Singaporean father could make an
application for adoption of his own biological child, and the situation is analogous
insofar as it would be “an adoption application in form but not in substance”.73 Surro-
gacy cases are arguably more reprehensible than out-of-wedlock cases as surrogacy
is a deliberate transaction involving multiple elaborate steps, whereas conceiving
a child out of wedlock may be the result of an act that occurs at the spur of the
moment, though it may also involve deliberate systematic violation of a marital vow.
Taking responsibility for a child conceived out of wedlock may in some cases have
a different moral hue from deliberately bringing a child about through surrogacy
and then seeking legitimacy in effect by using the ACA. Should the ACA be used
for the adoption of one’s own biological children, something quite different from
what was arguably originally envisaged by the ACA, which was “to place children in
good, safe homes if one or both parents were not able to provide for their biological
child”?74
Finally, it is recommended that if the government can find a public policy consid-
eration against recognizing children conceived through surrogacy, based on ethical
concerns with surrogacy and not wanting to encourage it, it has grounds to amend
the ACA to exclude the adoption of children conceived through surrogacy.
VI. Conclusion
While the High Court defined its role conservatively as that of interpreter of the law,
ironically, its holding turned out to approve of departures from the norms envisaged
or intended to be protected by different legal frameworks—relating to ART, section
377A, adoption, and citizenship.
1. ART: It granted an adoption order to a doctor who circumvented the de facto
prohibition of domestic surrogacy.
70 Women’s Charter, supra note 47, ss 92 and 122; Legitimacy Act, Cap 162, 1985 Rev Ed Sing [Legitimacy
Act], provides for the legitimation of children born out of wedlock.
71 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, 1999 Rev Ed Sing, art 122 read with para 15(1), Third
Schedule [Singapore Constitution].
72 ACA, supra note 12, s 4(5).
73 Re UKM, supra note 2 at para 19.
74 Ibid at para 22. An adoption in effect conferred legitimacy to the parent-child relation in circumstances
outside of the Legitimacy Act which dealt with biological children. It would seem that using the institution
of adoption to achieve the effect of legitimacy is a circumvention of the Legitimacy Act at least in
the cases of adoption of children born out of wedlock. But I will not argue that this case involves a
straightforward circumvention of the Legitimacy Act insofar as this case is not a classic “out of wedlock”
case contemplated at the time the Legitimacy Act was enacted.
Sing JLS Surrogacy, Child’s Welfare, and Public Policy in Adoption Applications 273
2. Section 377A: The adopter was in a sexual relationship, the constitutive acts
of which are the subject of a criminal prohibition oft-thought to be based on
morals, with a partner who planned to co-parent (indeed, both had provided
their sperm for the ART procedures).
3. Adoption: The adopter was already the biological parent, and adoption in such
circumstances—“an adoption application in form but not in substance”75—
was quite different from what was originally envisaged by the ACA, “to place
children in good, safe homes if one or both parents were not able to provide
for their biological child”.76 Moreover, the adopter applied as a single while
intending to co-parent.
4. Citizenship: By using the institution of adoption in a way different from what
was originally envisaged by the ACA, the appellant obtains the benefit of para
15(2)77 of the Third Schedule of the Singapore Constitution. The net result
was that there was a circumvention of the constitutional rules of citizenship
which denied citizenship by descent to illegitimate children, of Singaporean
fathers, born overseas.78
It is suggested that if the government does not wish to encourage its citizens to seek
overseas surrogacy, it should change current adoption laws to reflect this policy. If
it does not do so, not only might it end up indirectly approving of attempts to seek
overseas surrogacy, amongst other things, the edifice of the traditional notion of the
family that section 377A was meant to protect might also be chipped away.79
75 Re UKM, supra note 2 at para 19.
76 Ibid at para 22.
77 According to para 15(2), the references to a person’s father or to his parent or to one of his parents shall
be construed as references to the adopter.
78 Singapore Constitution, supra note 71, para 15(1), Third Schedule.
79 That said, the High Court did caveat that in “an appropriate future case”, an applicant’s pursuit of an
adoption application might be tainted with sufficient culpability that weighed against an adoption order:
UKM, supra note 1 at para 246.
